nglish. It is, after al

, of intention, and, I will add, of inspiration and capacity in
her newly-imposed rulers. Whether she liked them or not, at the outset,
would be beside the question. In this they would differ but
little from
those she had so long and wearily had measure of, and if they brought to
their new task a
new spirit and a new intellectual equipment Irishmen would not be slow
to realize that if they themselves were never to
rule their own country, they had, at least, found in their new masters
something more than emigration agents. Moreover, to Germany there would

be no "Irish question," no "haggard and haunting problem" to palsy her
brain and miscredit her hand with its old tags and jibes and sordid
impulses to deny the obvious. To Germany there would be only an English
question. To prevent that from ever again imperilling her world future
would be the

first purpose of German overseas statesmanship. And it is clear that a
wise
and capable Irish Administration, designed to build up and strengthen
from within and not to belittle and exploit from without, would be the
sure and certain purpose of a victorious
Germany. I have now outlined the two possible dispositions of Ireland
that up to this British opinion admits as conceivable in die improbable
event of a British defeat by Germany. Only
these two contingencies are ever admitted. First that Ireland, sharing
the common
disaster, must endure with her defeated partner all the evils that a
great overthrow must inflict
upon the United Kingdom. Second, that Ireland, if Great Britain